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Abstract
The Realm of Science claims to be an autonomous entity, governed by its own rules
and institutions. In practice it is difficult to test the extent to which different enveloping
political systems affect economics of basic research, as too many cultural and historical
differences would distort such a comparison. Unique historical circumstances make East and
West Germany the best available ground for setting up an experiment with both experimental
and control groups within societies and organizations. Testing the influence of socialistic
pressure on economic performance of scientific institutions, the analysis of East German
Academy of Sciences and West German Max Plank Society is performed. Possessing many
public good properties, basic research in natural sciences was supported by the government in
both countries and was similar across the borders in its structure, goals and culture.
Systematically comparing basic research in two institutions at its four stages of
conceptualization, experimentation, evaluation and implementation, this paper seeks to
identify significant qualitative influences of researcher, organizational, political and economic
structures on the research process. In addition to an American and German literature review,
personal interviews with scientists and administrators of several East and West German
research institutions are drawn upon in the analysis. Ultimately, the analysis leads to the
rejection of the preliminary hypothesis that the research process is independent of influences
of surrounding political and economic systems and concludes that Socialistic political system
and central-command economy have influenced basic research process directly as well as
through organizational structure.

I. Introduction
Advancements in the field of natural sciences have long ceased to be the sole products
of individual ingenuity.

The so-called invisible colleges, personal relations and

correspondence between individual scientists in the Middle Ages have developed into tangible
institutions and highly visible colleges supporting teams of scholars conducting both basic and
applied research.

Economic rather than scientific differences between the two types of

research lead to their separation into two distinct though interconnected branches.
Results of applied research in the natural sciences like physics and mathematics often
take the form of inventions or innovations, which can, theoretically, be developed into
marketable products directly. Most of the time, applied research is profitable and returns on
investments can be collected in the short run. In addition, a research program of applied
research can be planned to a large extent, like a production process, and most of the positive
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externalities can be internalized. It is, therefore, attractive to many industrial entrepreneurs
who make a research divisions a part of their industrial organizations. Today most applied
research is conducted in the R&D departments of manufacturing and technology companies.
This arrangement also determines the financing, internal structure, and performance of applied
research. In particular, Research and Development create a strong link between an economic
system within which research is conducted and the results of this research.
Basic research, on the other hand, possesses many qualities of a public good. It has a
higher degree of uncertainty than applied research and rarely yields profits in the short run.
Because of its uncertainty, it may not yield desired results under planned timing and financing.
It also carries potentially large positive externalities in the form of knowledge that cannot be
immediately applied, and would not be internalized properly by industry. To insure an
adequate “supply” of basic research, the government has to support pure research financially,
either by establishing its own scientific institutions or by financing independent research
centers.
These basic research institutions, their organizational structure, incentive system, and
even morale become insulated to a degree from the existing economic system, market
conditions or lack thereof. The above characteristics lead a young scholar like myself to test
the degree of insulation of basic research institutions from the surrounding economic system.
Economic considerations cannot be ignored altogether by anyone studying scientific
institutions. Although the private sector in most societies may play only a minor role in the
conduct of basic research, the public economic sector influences it directly. Even after a role
for the government as a modern patron of basic research is established, the vast amounts of
required funding still raise a lot of questions. For example, was the more than one billion
Deutsche Marks spent for basic science in West Germany in 1986 enough and if not, has an
increase up to 1.7 billion DM in 1993 been sufficient for conducting basic research? (vom
Brocke, 11). As everybody learns in elementary economics, resources are limited and any
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government faces a problem of optimally allocating these resources. Due to the uncertainty
and unpredictability of basic research, it is difficult to calculate an optimal amount of funding
for the support of science. This problem, however, is too large to be included in full in the
scope of this paper, and will only be mentioned briefly.
When financed by the government, basic research is often influenced by political goals
of the government, such as national security. Many people believe that only totalitarian
regimes like the former Soviet Union have utilized science in the military purposes. This is,
however, a worldwide phenomenon and not a unique feature of the socialist system.
Astrophysics research done during the Space Race, for example, was marked by pressure on
scientists as strong in the United States as that in the former Soviet Union. This pressure
often took an economic form of increased funding for basic research, opening up scientific
frontiers while pursuing strategic defense goals. In this sense, pure research has benefited
greatly from ultimate goals of its implementation, and vice versa -- in the long run, industry
has benefited from basic research findings, for example in the case of nuclear power stations.
It should be noted once again, however, that basic research findings rarely find immediate
applications in the industry. Short-term basic-applied research link for security purposes was
artificial and could exist mainly due to political security priorities and additional
governmental funding.
Political influence on pure science was not uniform across the borders, nor has it taken
the same forms. What distinguished government influence in the East from that in the West
was mainly the scope of interference and its inertia, or inflexibility. Both in the U.S. and the
former Soviet Union, high security and “Red Tape” (similar to the confidential materials
mark attached to secret documents and operations) policies were implemented in regard to
nuclear research projects. In the U.S. these policies covered only strategic projects, leaving
civil research open and flexible in communication. In the former USSR, the Red Tape policy
was institutionalized and extended to every form of strategic and non-strategic research,
5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

restricting researchers' access to information and communication among themselves at the
national and international levels.
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the strong governmental control, the
former Soviet Union had a very advanced standing in basic research, particularly in natural
sciences. Only since the 1970s has its scientific performance been decreasing. The reasons
for this decline are beyond the scope of this paper; as seen from the title, I will be writing
about German science, but perhaps this insight would shed light on a larger picture.

II. The Hypothesis
To understand “what went wrong” in Soviet science one could compare it to the
Western system and see which deviations in the organization or political pressure had the
greatest impact on the scientific decline. Such a comparison between any Western country
and the USSR, though, would be fraught with difficulty, as differences in historical
development, social system and culture are too big to ignore. However, if it could be done,
constructively and precisely, its use would be tremendous: by examining the corpse against a
healthy living body we would be able to find a cure for the illness that killed the sick man, or
in our case, the scientific sector. Many scholars believe that socialistic ideology and centralcommand economy were at the root of the problem (Menske, 7). Using another medical
analogy, however, removing the tumor does not necessarily make one healthy. After a head
tumor has been removed, an adult may be left half-paralyzed from various side effects created
by the tumor, or by the surgery. A doctor must, therefore, learn the full functioning of the
organism and its interaction with the tumor to design a cure for side effects that remain after
the tumor is removed. Similarly, a policymaker that wants to construct a more efficient
economic structure for basic research must first understand why has the old system broken
down.
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Unfortunately, such a precise comparison between the former Soviet Union and the
United States would be virtually impossible to conduct, as the basic unit of analysis, a
researcher, has different culture, mentality and aspiration in the U.S., incomparable with those
of his or her colleague in the USSR. Instead, a comparison between scientific institutions of
East and West Germany can be drawn. Several assumptions would have to be made, such as
to the “good health” of the West German science (represented by the Max Planck Society
institutes) and poor one of the former GDR’s (State Academy of Sciences institutes).
Comparative advancement of Western Science over Eastern supports these assumptions. This
economic research would require the fewest assumptions (in comparison with other possible
pairs for such a study) as common history and culture are the variables that can be kept
constant across the borders. The goal of the comparison would be first of all to examine the
in-depth operation of both systems, and then to determine the cause-and-effect path of the
downfall of the East German science. A virtual hypothesis (H0) is proposed: political and
economic systems have not affected the work of the East Germany’s scientific sector by
influencing organizational structure of research and researcher himself. A contrary (H1) could
then be stated: political and economic systems have negatively affected the work of the East
Germany’s scientific sector by influencing the research process directly, bypassing researcher
and organizational structure, the latter remaining basically the same in the 40 years of its
existence. I would then conduct a virtual experiment, viewing the East German institutions
under the Soviet influence as an “experimental group” and West German institutions as a
“control group”.
As with any social science experiment, however, this one would have a large degree of
uncertainty. In economics and econometrics, unlike in physics and chemistry, one can rarely
determine the cause-and-effect relationship between two phenomena.

For example, the

Phillips curve was believed to represent an unchanging inverse relationship between inflation
and unemployment; later studies showed that it “vanished” in the 1970s and some scholars
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believed it to be little more than coincidental statistics. Friedrich Hayek comments on the
theory behind the Phillips curve as “largely the product of a mistaken conception of the proper
scientific procedure” (Hayek, 25). Generalizing this misconception, Hayek concludes that
In economics (and in other disciplines that deal with ... “essentially complex”
phenomena), we can obtain quantitative data for only certain aspects of the events to
be explained, and thus necessarily limited number may not include the important
aspects. While in physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good
reason, that any important factor that determines the observed events will itself be
directly observable and measurable, in the study of such “essentially complex”
phenomena as the market, which depends on the actions of many individuals, all the
circumstances that will determine the outcome of a process will hardly ever be fully
known or measurable. (Hayek, 24)
Numerous externalities affect economic relations and cannot be disregarded in a complete
study. However, a thorough account of all possible side effects would distort, rather than
complete, the picture. All the conclusions drawn from this study, therefore, are rhetorical
rather than factual and should not be blindly implemented in government policies towards
scientific institutions.

III. Historical Background
Germany has long been known for its technological advancement both in research and
implementation. At the beginning of the century, however, the need for more basic research
in the natural sciences was recognized. To fill this vacuum, in 1911 a scientific organization
called the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft was established. It consisted of several basic research
institutes, mostly in natural sciences and medicine, covering traditional and non-traditional
areas, like corn research (KWG, 633). In the beginning this scientific society was controlled
by the government, but financed mostly through industry; it had strong connections with
manufacturing companies and a large part of its research was done for production purposes.
In the 1920s, German industry experienced heavy losses from the hyperinflation and
couldn't support Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft any longer. The government took over the
8
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responsibility for this, recognizing the high value of basic research done in the KWG
institutes. As industrial pressure was lifted from the scientists, they received greater freedom
in choosing their research areas. Perhaps this liberalization of science played the biggest part
in a notable increase of inventions and innovations in Germany in the next years: this period
in German history could be called “The Golden Twenties” not only for the general well being
of the decade.
Although financial support of basic research is usually undertaken by the government,
it should not be taken for granted that the poor, economically and socially unstable Germany
would have supported Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft instead of dismantling and destroying it.
The importance of this society, therefore, cannot be overestimated. It became the major basic
research institution in Germany. “Neither the Academy [one of German scientific societies],
nor institutions of higher learning [in the West Germany] ... could match the role played
[later] by the State Academy of the GDR and perform the function of the national Academy”
(vom Brocke, 10-11). Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft filled the niche of performing basic
research, and its heir, Max Planck Gesellschaft (MPG), played a role of the national academy,
which in East Germany was delegated to the Academy of Sciences (AdW). This functional
similarity gives an additional reason for our comparison of the two institutions.
During the 1930s Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft fell under control of the Nazi Party in
Germany; this dark period until the end of W.W.II is still barely illuminated by historians.
During that period many renowned scientists left the country to escape the totalitarian regime
and cruelty of the decade. Others were forced to leave, either because of their liberal views or
Jewish nationality. When asked by a Nazi functionary how the mathematics institutes were
doing since they had been relieved of Jewish members, the famed mathematician David
Hilbert is said to have replied: “Mathematics in Goettingen?

There is none anymore.”

Furthermore, basic research sector suffered more heavily than its applied research/industrial
counterpart that was converted to work for Hitler's military purposes (Beyerchen, 133).
9
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After World War II, the Germany was left demoralized, economically ruined and
occupied by troops. Furthermore, the distribution of “damages” varied across not yet existing
border between East and West. An East German source says that
Some 70% of the industry of the former German Reich were located in the zones
occupied by the Western powers. The remaining 30% of industrial plant on the
territory of the former Soviet Occupation Zone -- today the GDR -- was to 45%
destroyed, on the average. The extent to which production capacity was destroyed in
constructional engineering, for example, was 70%, and in metallurgy -- 80%. In
contrast to this, the level of destruction of the industry located in the West German
territory amounted on average to 20% (GDR: Science, 19)
This statistics is apparently distorted by the Eastern propaganda, diminishing the industrial
ruin of the West; destruction of heavy industrialized Rein region is averaged with light
damage of non-strategic manufacture of the South-West. East Germany, however, carried
even greater losses in the process of military advancement and post-war dismantling for the
spoils. As a result, after the break-up of Germany the two states faced different resources.
United States has helped West Germany to recover financially by the famous Marshall Plan;
industry was revitalized quickly in what became known as the “German Miracle.” Morally,
however, guilt and ambiguity about the Nazi past has long plagued the country. Surprisingly,
it played a positive role for the development of Western fundamental research. Thus “Nazi
abuse of science and glorification of technology became basic tenets of postwar assessments
of the German war effort, as well as implicit legitimization of the importance of support for
basic research” (Beyerchen, 133).
Moral considerations supported the allocation of funds for basic research, when the
country was still recovering economically. Close to 3 trillion Deutsche Marks were spent
between 1948 and 1955 on science and technology, of which 2.243 trillion DMs came from
the Laenders (FRG states). Under what has become known as Koenigstein Agreement, the
Laenders pledged to “collaborate in the provision of the necessary funds for scientific research
programmes

of

nation-wide

importance,

specifically,
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Max

Planck

Gesellschaft”

(Stifterverband, 23) The Max Planck Society was transformed from KWG, yet more than
just a name has changed. Several institutes in relatively less prominent fields were closed
while new ones in interdisciplinary or specialized areas like protein research were established
(KWG, 40-44). Further, the main goals of the new institution were redefined and purified.
Though MPG remained committed to conducting basic research and in many respects
performed a role of the national academy, its scope of activities has changed. In particular,
the founding fathers of MPG envisioned a research institution that would fill a gap between
universities and industry,
To take up promising, new fields of research which cannot or cannot adequately be
pursued at universities -- due either to their interdisciplinary character which does not
fit into the organizational framework of universities, or the fact that they require
equipment which is so expensive that it can neither be provided nor maintained by
universities (MPG, 13).
In East Germany the justification for conducting basic research was politically
stronger. There “a flourishing state of the sciences in all fields was accordingly regarded as
the essential condition that will lead finally towards the transition to a communist social
system (S&T Policy, 23). “ As an immediate result of this official policy, an Academy of
Sciences was established soon after the end of the war, in 1946. Former KWG Institutes
became the backbone of the Academy. It is difficult to say to what extent goals and ethic of
the KWG were altered in the reformation due to Soviet influence, yet it is plausible that the
organization of research remained the same, since the Soviet Academy of Sciences originally
took KWG as a model (vom Brocke, 15). Therefore, whatever structural influence the Soviet
Union might have had, it had an effect of “integrating the derivative,” imposing a similar, if
not the same system, with the higher degree of uncertainty.
Additionally, other research establishments, formerly existing separately, were
appended to the Academy of Sciences in 1950s (e.g. the Babelsberg Astronomical
Observatory, the Geodetic Institute in Potsdam, the Astronomical computing center at
11
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Babelsberg, and the Medical biological institutes at Buch). New institutes were moreover
founded within the Academy. “As a result, it was given an independent research staff in
natural and social sciences. By 1955, it grouped no fewer than 47 institutes and working
parties with 4,000 workers, among them 1,000 scientists” (S&T Policy, 18). Unlike in the
West, each new AdW institute was founded in a traditional field for advancement of already
existing knowledge. In the 1950's, interdisciplinary vs. traditional advancement of science
constituted perhaps the greatest difference between the two systems spread from the roots of
former Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft.
When discussing basic research, it is impossible to omit its applied counterpart,
especially from the a dynamic perspective. Yet after the war, the restoration of industry was a
higher priority. Applied research was more important for the economic survival of GDR, and
more resources were pulled in that direction. Proportional to the needs, there existed the
problems facing industrial R&D:
When after 1948, in the territory of the present GDR, democratic reconstruction began
and the large industrial undertakings were nationalized, there was a complicated
situation for the R&D institutions of industry. Many of them had been destroyed as a
result of the war. There were major disproportions, because many branches of industry
had their main centres and therefore their most important industrial research
establishments in the western part of Germany. Research documents available in the
nationally owned enterprises were in many cases stolen and carried abroad, and
numerous scientists and technologists induced to emigrate. Extraordinary differences
obtained as between the individual branches of industry in respect of the number of
scientists active in these various branches. At first it was only possible to use the
available material to begin construction (S&T Policy, 20).
I do not know how many resources were poured into restoring GDR's industrial R&D
potential. In the West, only one to five percent of the total science-allocated funds spent in
FRG (Stifterverband, 23) went to industrial research. In the East it is likely to have been more
than that. Efforts on both sides were rewarded, and rewarded quickly. Western Europe
praised “the German miracle” of FRG industrial revitalization, while GDR has built from
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scratch a miraculously efficient and strong production sector comparative to the other
countries of Socialist Block.
After the first years of rebuilding, both Germanys stepped on the path of balanced
scientific development.

The number of basic research institutes and applied research

laboratories steadily grew on both sides of the border. Higher education improved alongside
as new universities opened and more and more students prepared to enter all branches of
research. There were no excesses, like Lysenkoism in the former Soviet Union, and no major
booms or depressions in the East German scientific life. Research was conducted, and
discoveries made, patents filed and new products created, though not necessarily in that linear
order. The period did not bring a scientific boom to East Germany, perhaps, as it was
considered by the former Soviet Union more of a periphery, too small to have its own strong
science. As seen from Moscow,
At present no major scientific achievement in the GDR is conceivable without the
cooperation of the research establishments of the USSR. As a small country the GDR
is not in a position to advance scientific and technological progress on its own and to
cope with the wide range of problems connected with it (USSR-GDR, 29).
The Former Soviet Union was patronizing its “little brother”, providing for students and
researchers' exchange, sending an East German astronaut on a Russian space mission (S&T
Policy, 35).

The latter, however, occurred only in 1978, while general agreement on

cooperation in science was reached as early as 1951 (USSR-GDR, 18). Cooperation with the
former Soviet Union, nevertheless, was fruitful in that the necessary exchange of ideas and
information has taken place to insure development of natural sciences in GDR.

FRG

scientists have worked closely with their colleagues from America and Western Europe; and
yet across the Berlin Wall an intangible net of cooperation, collaboration, and ethics has
connected scientists from all over the world.
The nineteen sixties passed in the same quiet manner. Minor reforms did not change
either AdW or MPG Institutes. In the West, two major reforms, in 1964 and 1972, saw the
13
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introduction of more democratization and employees' participation in the administrative
decision process (Gerwin, 11-12). These positive changes, however, did not significantly
improve the relations or communication between the institutes or within them, as the
hierarchical structure has remained securely in place, supported by the strong majority of
conservative scientists (Gerwin, 12). Some programs were introduced in the East as well,
making just as little impact.
The late 1960's and early 70's, however, saw a spur of scientific activity created not by
scientists, but administrators. What in the East became known as “Suedenfall”, in the West
was christened simply as gigantomania – often unjustifiable growth of research institutes,
foundation of new ones, doubling and tripling of scientific and technical personnel.
Simultaneously in the East, scientific planning was attempted by the government to secure
further development:
In the early 1970s two long-range schemes were drawn up at national level. These
were (I) the “Scheme for the development of natural sciences and technology in
important sections of the national economy until 1990” and (II) the “Scheme for the
long-term development of fundamental research in natural sciences and mathematics,
as well as in selected technological directions within the range of the Academy of
Sciences of the GDR and of the Ministry for Higher and Technical Education until
1990”. The purpose of these Schemes has been to chart out, for the two decades
ahead, the main directions of research and technological development (S&T Policy,
39).
Both countries looked like they were preparing for the bigger challenges and major
breakthroughs.
Surprisingly, the next decade brought new achievements for the applied rather than
basic research. Industrial laboratories and research centers were set up on a large scale in both
East and West Germanys. In the East they took the form of the Academy-Industry Complexes
(Akademie-Industrie Komplexes, AIK), which conducted research for industry on “concerted
R&D projects, for example in certain fields of medical products, of microbiology, and of
organic polymer compounds” (S&T Policy, 47).

These complexes were seen as a link
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between basic research and industry and, like many socialist undertakings, were built on a
large scale.

In addition to that, the so-called construction bureaus, in effect R&D

departments, were opened at almost every production center. In 1977 in industry and in civil
engineering, there were almost 130 production complexes in which more than 110,000
employees were engaged in R&D, accounting for about 90% of the industrial potential in
R&D (S&T Policy, 29). In 1980s the share of R&D conducted at these production complexes
has shrunk as more and more applied research was done at AIKs. It is difficult to evaluate
AIKs’ performance, as relevant statistics were most likely exaggerated for ideological reasons.
In the West, the so-called Science Parks were created. Similar in purpose to Silicon
Valley in the United States, these technological centers had nevertheless substantial
distinctions. First of all, Science Parks did not grow in and out of themselves, but were set up
by the government. As Sunman and Lowe notice, “the pattern and speed of development has
strongly been influenced by government -- especially regional government -- policies
(Sunman, ix)”. Laenders have once again stepped in to increase their economic potential; this
time through applied rather than basic scientific research. In that, as in an initiative to create
Science Parks, West Germany was more alike with East Germany than with the United States.
Perhaps because of the top-down approach, Science Parks have performed rather poorly
compared to their American prototypes, though nevertheless increasing technological
potential.
Another difference between Silicon Valley and, for example, Dortmund Science Park,
was a poor industry-university link on the German side. While in California Stanford and
Berkeley are quoted for their contribution to the creation of Silicon Valley (and its leading
companies Apple, Sun, and Hewlett-Packard, to name a few), in Germany
One interesting feature common to virtually all the parks is that companies usually
expect to gain more benefit from each other, than from the associated higher
educational institute, through the simple presence of like-minded people, to
opportunities for sub-contracting and for undertaking joint projects (Sunman, ix).
15
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The same poor link between AIKs and universities can be traced in the GDR. Universities,
though places of academic research, were not connected to industrial R&D labs, primarily
because the two were governed by two different ministries.
Just as AIKs worked as a joint effort of the Industry and the Academy of Sciences,
West German Science Parks often collaborated with MPGs on projects with common interest,
for example, in biological and nuclear physics technologies (Sunman, 51). In a general trend
in the 1980s, applied research strongly dominated basic research conducted in MPG and
AdW. More and more resources from the Institutes were pulled to support Industry. It is
difficult to say whether this trend would have continued smoothly if Germany had not been
reunited.
In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and with it the tangible barrier separating the two parts of
the German science. Reunification of the scientific sector proceeded no more smoothly than
that of the social or political sectors. Wissenschaftsrat -- West German Scientific Council -has made assessments of the performances of the AdW institutes and published a set of
recommendations to the new unified government regarding these institutes. Some, such as the
laboratory for high energy research in physics in Zeuthen, were given very high ratings and
transferred under administration of the West German institutions, such as high-energy particle
physics DESY Lab, or saved under the so-called “Blue List” initiative (Wissenschaftsrat (a),
52). Others were dissolved by the special commission (KAI, 32). This, of course, created high
unemployment among the best-educated citizens of the former GDR. Partially to prevent a
brain drain, and partially to utilize the new human and capital resources, MPG has extended
its activities to the newly added eastern states and has already founded five new institutes. It
is still uncertain, however, whether Max-Planck-Gesellschaft would become for the new
united Germany what Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft was for the old Germany -- the national
academy for sciences, or whether MPG will peacefully co-exist with the transformed AdW
(Blue List Institutes). The goal of the new united German government is to find the most
16
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effective system that would insure a smooth and efficient functioning of the German research
institutes.

V. The Analytical framework
It is always difficult to say precisely what determines the performance of such a
creative and uncertain process as scientific work. As mentioned in the beginning, much more
than a researcher's talent or desire for work goes into the research, but available equipment,
access to information, and outside pressure also play their part in the outcome. To analyze
what determines the performance of a researcher in absolute terms would be difficult, but we
can try to compare several sources of influence to understand which phenomena are more
important to the research process in relative terms.
I start by identifying four main factors determining a research outcome. The first one
would naturally be a researcher himself, his talent and creativity. The second one would be an
internal organization structure in which a researcher must work. The third would be the extent
of government participation (mostly for political reasons). The last factor would be the
economic system which envelops the scientific sector and within which it operates. Specific
influences on the research process will be identified later; for structural purposes, they can be
viewed as subcategories of the four main categories.
Each of the four factors and numerous forces placed in their respective subcategory
affect the research process at different stages with different intensity. I call these stages of
research conceptualization, experimentation, interpretation, and implementation. During the
conceptualization stage, a scientist formulates a new idea into a hypothesis, in the second
stage he or she tests this hypothesis either through direct experimentation or by gathering
more materials related to the hypothesis. In the natural sciences such as chemistry or physics,
the second stage usually takes the form of laboratory experiments, while in mathematics it
would include software development of computer simulations. Various items of software are
17
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also used for data analysis in laboratory experiments, but interpretation of any data or
computer-generated data analysis is done by a scientist on the third stage of the research
process. Implementation, or application of results is not a part of basic research, but many
believe it to be an integral stage of scientific process, and its examination, therefore, might
bring valuable insights into the overall research process.
The two identified aspects of any research, its procedural stages and various factors
influencing its progress can form a matrix, where interaction of different factors at different
stages of the research process can be traced and analyzed in a Research Stages/Research
affecting Factors Matrix (Fig 1). Each element identified by a letter and a number refers to the
section with a discussion on the influence of a corresponding factor on a research process
stage.

Conceptualization

Experimentation

Interpretation

Implementation

Researcher
Organizational
Structure

A1

A2

A3

A4

B1

B2

B3

B4

Political System

C1

C2

C3

C4

Economic System

D1

D2

D3

D4

Fig. 1 Research Stages/Research-affecting Factors Matrix

Ideally, an intensity of this interaction could be measured as well, but as Hayek has
observed, such information would never be measured precisely. I analyze the influence of the
aforementioned factors on each step of the research process comparatively and therefore
uncertainly, drawing information from various publications and personal interviews with the
researchers and administrators at MPG and former AdW institutes. The views expressed by
each of these people are subjective, sometimes contradictory depending on their experience
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within the system, thus adding even more uncertainty to this study. Uncertainty deforms the
presented structure already in the definition of subcategories of the four main factors.
This particular paper, for space considerations, presents only the evaluated and
structured results of the research. One “cell” of the evaluation matrix is presented for the
demonstration purposes. The full text of the research paper with the completed matrix is
available directly from the author.

VI. Evaluation
A1. The role of a researcher at the conceptualization stage
All the subcategories (vaguely) defined, I shall now examine each one in relation to the
research process.

At the conceptualization stage, the individual mind, its creativity,

inquisitiveness, and imagination play the crucial role in every scientific field in any country.
Education and experience are important as necessary requirements for bringing creative
thinking to a scientific level. Although such intangible concepts as talent and creativity
cannot be measured accurately at a national level, we can assume that the East and West
Germanys due to the common history and culture contained populations with the same or very
similar national characteristics with respect to innate abilities and inclination towards natural
sciences (after all, forty years of socialist regime could not mutate the genes of the East
German population). As to acquired abilities, measured by education and experience, many
Western observers “who by no means love the GDR... can no longer avoid the fact that the
educational system... in the GDR [is] exemplary” (Meeting, pg. 19), although working
experience was probably of a lower quality due to the equipment deficit in the former GDR. I
would conclude that, on average, the role a scientist played at the conceptualization stage of
development was roughly the same both in East and West Germany.
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VII. Systematization
Filling up the Research Stages/Research-affecting Factors Matrix alone does not show
which one of the stated hypothesis about GDR natural sciences research are correct. To get
closer to the answer we would have to examine first the interaction between the Factors
affecting Research and see their possible relationship, dependence and relative importance for
the research process.

Instead of drawing up another matrix, I will conceptualize the entire

research operation process in a dynamic diagram (Fig. 4) and later examine the most
interesting links between the five main concepts as they operated in the former GDR.
Political
System

Economic
System
Organizational
Structure

Researcher

Research Process
Fig. 4 Basic Research Operation System
Most of the links in the diagram are immediately recognizable as visual representations of the
influences of research-affecting factors on the research process itself, discussed in the
evaluation. A Researcher influences the Research Process, for example, but the Political
System acts on several levels, through Organizational Structure and the Researcher as well as
directly influencing the Research Process. Except three instances, arrows point only one way.
The Researcher, his or her Research Process or Organizational Structure are relatively too
small to have a significant influence respective Political and Economic Systems. Possible
influence of smoothness or quality of the Research Process on the Researcher is too
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psychological to be measured in an economic study; therefore, an arrow pointing from the
Research Process to the Researcher is not solid. Another broken line connects the Economic
System and the Researcher boxes also to show possible psychological effects.
The two solid lines going both ways deserve special attention. An arrow from the
Researcher to Organizational Structure could in theory be drawn also broken or dotted, for in
the age of institutions a single person cannot fight an entire structure. In the former GDR,
though, with its personalized bureaucracy it could become more real than in the West, and
therefore I left the arrow solid. Interaction between Political and Economic Systems was not
discussed before and will be touched upon later in this section to the extent that it relates to
the operation of basic research in the former GDR.
A “broken” economic influence on the researcher is due to my (and perhaps everybody
else’s) inability to measure accurately an effect of worse living conditions in the centralcommand economy on a researcher. It was perhaps the psychological pressure of constant
food and products shortages, small apartments “issued” by the government and so on,
especially in comparison with the Western abundance that has distracted East German
scientists at home and affected their efforts in research. The incentive system, which was
placed in the organizational structure category for structural purposes (low opportunity costs,
though being an influence of an economic system, are nevertheless part of the incentive
system, and are consequently placed in the same organization section), has both positive and
negative effects. Thus, in the above diagram the economic system affects a researcher through
organizational structure (not only in the former GDR). There remain, however, many more
immeasurable ways in which economic environment influences a researcher’s psyche, and for
those a broken line is left between the two boxes.
The influence of a researcher on organizational structure should be examined more
carefully. As a group, scientific community may exert a lot of pressure, influence some
political decisions, such as environmental protection, but will not significantly alter either
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political or economic structures. Joining together in their demands, however, scientists are
able to restructure permanently their own environment, an internal organization of their
institutes, or found a new scientific organization like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. A
single researcher, on the other hand, will have little influence even inside his own scientific
sphere without the support of his peers. There are some notable exceptions to this statement.
Professor Harnack, for example, founder of one of the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, has
established there a hierarchy that is still present in the Max Planck Gesellschaft institutes
referred to previously as the Harnack-Prinzip. Without other directors instituting the same
system in their laboratories, however, the Prinzip would not survive longer than Harnack’s
lifetime.

Moreover, without general trends in German society for social, political, and

economic hierarchy outside the scientific sector, Harnack’s principle would have died out as
well or not even been instituted in the first place.
Let us turn to another example briefly mentioned in the evaluation section. I have
claimed that the Zeuthen Laboratory performed incredibly well, according to a high rating
from the Wissenschaftsrat especially due to the efforts of Dr. Lanius, Zeuthen’ director since
1972. In particular, Special Commission of the Scientific Council has noted on a high
scientific expertise and competitiveness, and recommended further operation of the institute
(Wissenschaftsrat (a), 54), unlike that of the Einstein Laboratory for Theoretical Physics,
which was later dismantled. Among difficulties that plagued Einstein Laboratory, “no access
to Western publications, inability to attend Western conferences (though holding numerous
invitations)” were mentioned (Wissenschaftsrat (a), 56-57). These problems were solved to a
larger extent in Zeuthen only by the influence of Dr. Lanius (from an interview with P.
Soeding). By being a good diplomat, a “trusted communist”, and a good player in the Party
bureaucracy's corruption game, Lanius was able to get favors from his superiors, such as
access to Western publications for Zeuthen. Due to his efforts, approximately a quarter of
Zeuthen scientists could go to DESY or CERN for joint projects and to attend conferences;
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that strengthened the incentive and communication systems, two integral elements of the
scientific organizational structure. One can only speculate, of course, at what costs these
favors were bought -- personal bribes, an occasional paper written by the scientist for an
administrator to be published or presented on the Western conference. The important thing is
that Lanius’s efforts were rewarded.

Although he was not able to change the entire

organizational structure of the former GDR, he has done it inside the walls of his own institute
and that allowed Zeuthen to become a world-class research institute. The influence of one
person, therefore, should not be underestimated: if several other AdW’s natural science
research institutes had had similar directors, greater freedom in communication and personnel
mobility might have become a norm, having a significant impact on the GDR’s organizational
structure.
It is important to recognize, though, that energy and able management by Dr. Lanius
have greatly contributed to, but did not determine fully, the success of Zeuthen Institute. Many
of the aforementioned communication features such as e-mail and an open library carrying
both Eastern and Western publications have paved the road to success precisely because they
were enthusiastically and extensively used, alongside with many innovations in working
equipment (i.e. computers replacing drawing boards).

A workshop, where necessary

equipment was often produced by scientists' craftsmanship, was probably a unique feature of
the Zeuthen Institute (from interview with Dr. P. Soeding). This home-made equipment gave
Zeuthen scientists a competitive advantage over their Eastern, and sometimes Western,
colleagues and could be considered as one of the “success-determining factors”. Personal
contributions of Dr. Lanius, no doubt significant, have thrived only because of hard work,
creativity and talent of the entire Institute staff.
Economics and politics operate through mutual interactions, like church and state in
the Middle Ages. Although the latter pair was functionally separated long ago, the former is
likely to continue its symbiotic relationship.

Interaction between politics and economics in
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the former GDR would be a useful topic to explore, yet it lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
S. Kornai has studied the mutual relationship between the socialistic government and centralcommand economy in his extensive work The Socialist System, and I direct everybody to that
book for further insights.
It may be interesting, however, to see what other scholars have added to the question
of politics-economics interaction particularly in relation to scientific research. Prof. Menske
believes that
Whereas in West Germany a strongly differentiated system with functionally
specialized and mostly autonomous institutions emerged, East Germany science is
characterized by hierarchical structures and the endeavor to integrate various functions.
GDR policy was dominated by ideologically determined conceptions of a linear model
of innovation. This conceived of utilizing the “productive force science” especially
along a chain from basic research to production:
Basic
Research

Applied
Research

Experimental
Development

Manufacture

Production

The entire management system of the GDR was accordingly constructed in the form of
a pyramid.
Both the economic and scientific sectors were integrated in the
management system. (Menske, pg.5)
This explanation contains some serious flaws. The linear model of innovation, so
popular after WWII both in the West and in the East, has recently been found to “distort(s) the
reality of innovation and most serious students of innovation have no come to recognize these
distortions. In the linear model there are no feedback paths with the ongoing work of
development processes” which are “essential to evaluattion of performance, to formulation of
the next steps forward, and to assessment of competitive position” (Kline, 286). A pyramidal
organizational structure described by Menske, characterizing the production rather than
innovation was present in East and West Germany, reinforced historically by the vertical
hierarchy of the Nazi regime. The pressure from industry on the AdW was also very weak in
the East Germany, contrary to the Menske assessments (except in strategic research).
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Despite this criticism, Menske’s argument should be taken into account. Integration of
the economic and scientific sectors under one all-planning management system was one of the
main causes of rigidity of the socialistic basic research sector. An attempt to create an
integrated linear flow of basic research into applied and so on has failed because there is no
natural mechanism insuring implementation of basic research results. The latter can be
achieved only with direct government intervention. Basic research in natural sciences has
another “peculiarity” -- it is hard for non-scientists (in my example, for Party apparatchiki
occupying high administrative posts, who rarely were able scientists as well) to evaluate new
developments in science, arising need of inter-disciplinary research, and so on. Flexibility of
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, on the other hand, could stem only from its autonomous position as
a scientific society. Rigidity of the AdW structure, an effect of the socialistic government and
central-command economy, could in turn be a cause of the AdW’s downfall and eventual
dismantling.
Let me now turn back to the stated hypotheses and use the systematic diagram as an
evidence, or rather as the result of testing the hypotheses. Despite a relative isolation of basic
research in natural sciences from an enveloping political economy, H(0) does not hold:
political and economic systems have affected research process not only directly, but through
influence on organizational structure and on the researcher himself. The latter two were
significantly altered by the former in the 45 years of Soviet domination. Such a simple and
even obvious result could nevertheless be meaningful. In particular, it could be used to
analyze a performance of basic research institutions in Eastern Europe and particularly in the
former East Germany today. After the two influencing factors -- socialistic government and
central-command economy -- are removed from the picture, several constraints and
disincentives, no doubt, disappear with them as well. A distorted organizational structure,
nevertheless, remains in place, and to a lesser extent mentality of a scientist. Letting research
institutes operate today as they did under old conditions would not increase their productivity
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to the highest desired potential. New economic and political conditions, in other words, are
not enough; something has to be done about old institutes.
In the former GDR a solution was found to “cut out sick tissue and replace it with
healthy tissue” by closing a majority of the AdW institutes and opening new MPG centers
instead. This solution might not have been the best in the short run, leaving thousands of
qualified scientific personnel jobless, but in the long run it may bring its benefits. Newly
founded institutes, not hindered by the remnants of organizational disfunctionings would be a
better, healthier environment for further advancement of German science. If the Blue List
institutes -- non-closed former AdW institutes -- will not be restructured, a further comparison
between their performance and the MPG would be possible for a better insight on which of
the two systems has fared better. Other Eastern European countries, however, don’t have
alternative systems of basic research operating as the new unified Germany does. These
countries either have to restructure their existing systems or build entirely new ones on one of
the Western models. Either way, the crucial question will be one of funding. Countries in
transition simply will not have (now or in the near future) any money to spend on their
scientific basic research sector, especially on restructuring. Restructuring, however, has to be
done, sooner or later.

VII. Conclusion
I began this thesis with a brief discussion of the former Soviet Union and would like to
end it on the same subject.

The problem of funding is critical in today's Russia:

unemployment among scientists is higher than ever, and one may point out that it is not the
time to seek problems that existed in the past and call for restructuring. In a few years (I hope,
and fear that it may take decades rather than years), the transitional period will be over. By
then, a new democratic government would have time and resources to look at its basic
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research sector and act to improve it. What would be the best thing to do? Perhaps these
future administrators would look upon Germany for a solution, like Peter the Great had once
done to speed up Russia’s development.
What would the German example show? One of the main conclusions from studying
the two systems, MPG and AdW, concerns the importance of autonomy in scientific
operations. For the best results, administrative management of basic research should be done
from within and organizational structure should be formed according to the structural
demands and conditions of basic research. Another, no less important factor, would be the
need for flexibility in the system, as most of the problems that plagued AdW basic research
could be summarized into one word -- rigidity. Flexibility, however, should not be imposed
from above. Such interference would conflict with the autonomy necessary for the most
optimal operation of the research. The third lesson from this analysis is the importance of
inter-disciplinarity in basic research. Although traditional areas still hold large scientific
potential, the majority of discoveries are made on the edge, at the intersection of two fields
that often grow into a field of its own, like biotechnology1.
The lack of inter-disciplinarity might not have been the primary reason behind East
Germany’s poorer performance as compared with the West, but it has severily limited the
overall scientific framework. It is possible that even without the political restrictions that
existed, the basic research system would have stagnated, reaching a dead end in traditional
scientific areas.

Under the “supervision” of the Communist Party, however, day-to-day

research processes were slowed down through communication obstacles, etc. so that the
scientific dead end would not be reached for several decades.
Last but not least, the internal problem that Russian government has to face is its
incentive structure. Under current economic difficulties, the question of competitive salaries
1

Nanotechnology is just one of the examples of the field that could not be created in biology or engineering
alone.
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for scientists must be solved first. Financial resources in the form of salaries, facilities and
equipment, however, will not provide sufficient incentive alone. The entire structure has to be
changed. Old incentives, i.e. ability to work or travel to the West, have disappeared as the
Iron Curtain fell.

The newly emerged private sector on the other hand provides new

disincentives to go into basic research as more jobs in industry are opened to scientists. Other
incentives for the fundamental research sector have to be created, economic as well as
ideological. A better system of grant and fellowship distribution is needed, perhaps through
non-profit organizations, perhaps, once again, through the government.
Besides internal transformations within the scientific sector, external actions by the
government are needed badly. Although financial resources are hard to find at present, tax
incentives may motivate the industry to spend more money on basic research (as mentioned,
in the U.S. 25% of basic research is done by private sector). This or a similar policy might
kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it will promote conduct of basic research
under a tight public budget; on the other hand, it will reinforce research-industry ties and lead
to higher implementation rate of research findings. That, in turn will lead to higher economic
performance and larger funding for publicly-supported science. This science and technology
cycle is essential to bring the Russian economy forward to economic prosperity, and keep her
there alongside other developed nations.
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Annex A
Sample questions asked on interviews with scientists and administrators of various
research institutions in the former FRG and GDR
Travel/Personal Mobility:
How would you describe overall your connections with other scientific institutions in your
field and in the related fields both inside and outside the former GDR?
How often were your scientists invited on the national and international conferences? How
often did they attend? What determined their attendance, or, rather, what prevented it -- lack
of time or personal desire, institutional constraints or difficulties with the government
authorization?
What other means of communication existed between the scientists of your institution and
their colleagues in other institutions nation-/world-wide, besides conferences? How
restricted were those means of communication) for example, did every scientist had an access
to a work telephone, were the calls paid for by the institute)?
How easy was the access to scientific literature, especially the Western one, for the members
of your institution? How easy was an access to the scientific information (research reports,
library materials) in the different departments and different national institutions for your
researchers?
Harnack-Printzip
How much power was delegated to the director of your institution? How much did the
director participate in the scientific activity of the institute? Financial? Administrative? How
much “veto power” did the director had over decisions of heads of departments and separate
laboratories? Did all the decisions and resolutions of the institute have to be channeled
through the director's office?
How would you describe the so-called Harnack Prinzip and to what extent do you believe it
has operated in your institution? What do you see as major changes in the internal structure of
your institute and why? How would you describe the structure of your institute in terms of
rigidity/flexibility? What changes would you personally introduce if you were the head of the
institute and operating under Harnack Prinzip?

Institute-Industry links
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Did you have close contacts with any of the industry branches? Did you have any special
contracts for basic research from the Applied Research offices of the industrial plants? If yes,
were there strict deadlines, high standards and other forms of pressure felt from the industry?
How well do you think your research findings were utilized by the industry? As a scientist
conducting basic research, to what extent do you believe the goals set by the industry should
influence the direction of basic research, and how did the industry objectives actually
influence the mission setting at your institution? What other forces besides the researcher's
desire to pursue his research have influenced the choice of the research projects and
directions?
What kind of equipment do you need to conduct your research successfully? Where did this
equipment usually come from, home or abroad? How quickly did the equipment was installed
and exploited, and how was it maintained?
Political Pressure
Did you ever feel any kind of political pressure from your supervisors or directly from the
authorities? What forms did it take? At what step of the research process do you believe this
influence was most significant: mission setting, research process, and research
implementation?
Incentive/Reward Structure
What do you think were the main incentives for the scientists to join your institution and
participate actively in its activities, i.e.. moral, material. For example, if you have this kind of
information, what were the salaries of the junior/senior scientists, in the 1970’s -- 80’s,
especially in comparison with the national average wage at that time. Were there any
additional benefits from the government provided to the members of your institute, for
example, free housing, transportation, etc. How would be a successful scientist rewarded in
the beginning of his career -- would his name be mentioned in the papers, would he be given a
separate laboratory or special equipment? What would happen to a scientist who did not
produce any particular results? To what extent do you believe Matthew's effect was operating
in your institution? What would you improve in the incentive structure to insure an even
better performance of the German scientists?
What do you think has contributed the most to your success?
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Annex B
Summary of the interview with Paul Soeding, director of Institute for High Energy
Physics at Zeuthen, Germany (former GDR)
Zeuthen Laboratory was a successful research institute even under the socialist regime
in former East Germany. This was due mainly to Dr. Lanius, who was the director for more
than 25 years (1962 - 1988). Lanius recognized the importance of communicating with the
outside world for scientists and did everything he could to promote freedom of scientific
information and contact within the institute (but not any political information, of course!).
One of such achievements was the library, open to all including visitor scholars, since
Western scientific literature usually was not available to scientists in other institutions. Of
course, to enter the institute one had to have an invitation, and once a member of the institute
got into trouble because a Western scientist, hearing about his colleague's work, wanted to
visit him at Zeuthen.
This shows that connections with the West and generally with “foreign” scientists were
closely monitored. Contacts not only with the West German or “capitalist world” scientists,
but even with the Russian colleagues in Dubna were restricted. To visit one's international
correspondents in Dubna or DESY, Hamburg, an East German scientist (and Zeuthen
members were no exception) had to apply for the government permission and wait at least a
year while all his invitations and recommendations would be examined and his party loyalty
checked. Thanks to Lanius's influence in the party circles, where he had a very high position,
Zeuthen had one very important mean of communication -- e-mail, which had kept it
connected with the Western world and allowed the scientists to go along with their Western
colleagues in the avant-garde of science. Though it was monitored by the authorities,
scientific information could pass freely across the borders.
Generally, all information was monitored, conversations were reported to the special
government officials by special informants. This created a lack of trust and collaboration
among the members of the institute. People wanted to free themselves from the atmosphere
of mutual suspicion by going to DESY, Hamburg, to CERN, or to Dubna. Mainly scientists
could travel. Also some engineers, occasionally also technicians. Of those, about 2/3 were
allowed to go to Russia or generally to the socialist countries, and 1/4 to the West for the
prolonged periods for cooperative projects. These numbers were still considered to be very
high among AdW natural sciences institutes.
As far as the equipment goes, it was mostly produced with Zeuthen Lab's own resources
inside special workshops. An exception was the computational technology, personal
computers, for example. Since they were underproduced in the Eastern bloc countries and
were immediately exported to the former USSR, so the computers for Zeuthen Lab would
have to be imported from the West. But this was not possible for two reasons. First, they
would have cost hard currency that was notoriously very short, and, secondly, the better
computers really needed for the work done at Zeuthen were all embargoed by the West. So
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the computers came from Russia or Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, etc. It took years for the
orders to go through, and computers arrived already outdated.
Ironically, this had a positive side as well, as the scientists at Zeuthen, sick of the
outdated technology, were more creative to designing their own software, for example, or
embracing the new technology. At DESY, Hambourg, for example, engineers and electronics
designers were reluctant to switch from the old-fashioned framing boards to the computers
with special software and had to be persuaded to this innovation. At Zeuthen, on the other
hand, engineers were curious and enthusiastic about working with new equipment.
Generally, there were few links with the industry, close to none, since in the short run the
basic research performed at IfH Zeuthen was “useless”. However, there was enormous
pressure work hard and show good results, because otherwise the institute would be in danger
to be closed for its “uselessness”.
Director's efforts, as we have seen, have kept the institute afloat and quite successful.
The director was not omnipotent, however: he could not fire a person, for example, but all the
financial, scientific, and administrative papers had to go through his office and further up the
bureaucratic ladder. Director had his own Academy and Party bosses in front of whom he was
answerable. But, contrary to the opinion, there was in some respects less bureaucracy in the
East than in the West Germany, because some of the decisions were made by inter-personal
deliberations rather than through administrative routine.
Still, due to his position and strong Harnack-Prinzip retained in the system mainly
because it was favorable to the hierarchical structure of the socialist administration, a director
had a lot of power and could do almost anything inside his institute, as shown in the example
with the libraries. For that, of course, he had to be a good diplomat, like Lanius was, and he
had to have very good friends in the high echelons of the Socialist Party.
Though people have changed, the internal structure had remained basically the same
until 1989. But one part of the internal structure had deteriorated greatly, that is, the incentive
structure. Though Zeuthen Lab research was successful, it could have been three times as
successful, was it done in the West. There are many reasons for this. Foremost, it was a lack
of freedom, free scientific exchange, the whole depressing atmosphere of a country run by a
party system repressing individual freedom and initiative; second, lack of resources (i.e.
computers), and in general a lack of a good industrial basis. Many people wasted their
valuable time designing and building things that in the West one simply buys. Even primitive
materials were often hard to come by. People also wasted infinite time waiting for deliveries,
searching for sources, etc. Third, progress was pronounced to be for the sake of advancing the
socialist doctrine as defined by the party, and people knew that it was all lies and hypocrisy
and corruption, and they became extremely frustrated.
Frustrated and disenchanted, many scientists did not make an effort to work harder
than necessary, especially since they were not materially awarded for extra efforts. Junior
researchers received significantly less then the factory worker, and only a half of what his
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director would get. The only prize for hard work would be the recognition of the senior staff
and the possibility to travel abroad to Dubna or Hamburg on their recommendation. Even that
required political obedience or at least lip service as well, at least as far as traveling to the
West was concerned. Possibility to work in the atmosphere of relative trust was an award in
itself, to escape the frozen society, though to work in the West a scientist had to leave his
family back home as an insurance of his eventual return. But there were many scientists who
for political reasons were not allowed to exit the country and they finally lost the little
incentive there was to work hard. There always remained, of course, the few scientists who
worked for the science itself, and they were always the ones to conquer the new frontiers in
their field.
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Annex C
Summary of the interview with Leo Stodolsky, scientist at Max Planck Institute for
Physics at Munich, Germany (former FRG)
MPP (Max Planck Institute for Physics) is a theoretical and experimental basic
research institute, mostly publicly funded. It is one of the leading research centers in the
scientific world. Its members are often invited to the conferences and for collaboration
projects in other institutes, such as DESY, Hamburg, and CERN, Geneva. Even before 1989
MPP had contacts with other research institutions in the East. Its scientists went to DUBNA,
Moscow, and Yerevan, had regular meetings in Krakow and participated in occasional
formal collaborations etc., particularly with Krakow. There was no pressure from the Western
authorities to restrict East-West scientific contacts.
With the Western partners scientific communication and exchange was well established.
Since early 80s the institute has received Internet access and gradually all the scientists had email, telephones were available, though not long distance in every office. Duration of
international calls was monitored because of the costs, but it was nevertheless allowed to call
international for scientific purposes. The same financial limitations allowed a senior scientist
to attend a conference only about three times a year (without any restrictions to the location.)
The library was full with scientific journals (including translated major Russian
publications) and open to everybody within the institute and visitors. It was quite easy to enter
the institute and use the library for the outsiders, they just had to register with the secretariat.
For research facilitation, a copy machine was available in the library.
Despite strong connections with the scientific world, MPP had little links to the industry,
because basic research performed there had none or close to none immediate applications.
Under “basic research” are meant not only theoretical findings, but also experimental
research. The institute had strong experimental groups and a big workshop that took up most
of the budget and about 2/3 of the scientific personnel.
Once a project was approved it was generally well supported. Influential directors,
however, could get better support for their projects. Directors had a lot of power also due to a
strong influence of the Harnack principle. A director could not fire a person, of course,
because of the strong union and government. regulations, but short of that he could do
everything within his institute, and all the papers went through his office. The “Betriebsrat”
[work council] approval was necessary for personnel decisions, but usually it does not
influence them. In that sense, and in many others the internal structure has remained the same
and little has changed during 60's -- 90s.
Political pressure was almost non-existent, even though some influence could be exerted
by individuals who wanted to implement their political opinions, i.e. against nuclear research.
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Government did not set any goals or monitored any project; however, sometimes it contracted
institutes to participate in a specific project with government monitoring and supervision.
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Annex D
Summary of the interview with Leon Mishanaevsky, scientist at MPA Institute for
Metallurgy at Stuttgart, Germany (former FRG)
Materialprufungsanstalt (MPA) is an applied metal research institute. It has strong
links with the industry and often receives industrial orders. It is, therefore, only partially
funded by the government and receives most of its operational revenue from industrial orders.
There was no strong connection wit the government and no political pressure was felt.
Relationship with the industry has taken a form of traditional meetings once every four
months. Researchers read their papers, their colleagues in business in turn express their
desires as to the direction/ betterment of further research, and in this discussion a plan for the
next few months is worked out.
Deadlines are strict, “do it or die.” If the job is not done in time, penalties would be
imposed by the ordering company on the institute, and the scientist at fault would get
punished by his or her superiors. This is an incentive system that takes a form of stick rather
than carrot. Carrots would be director’s recognition, salary raise, etc.
Harnack Prinzip still operates on a high level -- inside the MPA there is a strict hierarchy.
Director is quite strong and has a lot of power. He is not omnipotent and does not have a
“veto power” over heads of laboratories, but his word carries the heaviest weight in any
decision.
A working atmosphere is easy and relaxing (to an extent that people would not slack
off). During lunch an entire team would sit down to chat about outside things, but hierarchy
would be so strong that nobody would stand up and leave before the team head.
In terms of equipment there never were any problems. Scientists perform mainly
computations and simulations on their work stations. Equipment is either home industryproduced or foreign-made in U.S. or Japan.
In general research done at the MPA is very good, but it is not utilized fully by the
industry.
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